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ARGUMENT 
In its brief, Appellee Smith Springs asserts that the Fullingims did not meet the 
standard for overturning a default judgment under Rule 60(b). However, Smith Springs 
mimics the district court by looking at the wrong subsection of the rule and applying the 
wrong standard. Smith Springs erroneously states that to set aside the default judgment, 
the Fullingims had to show that a judgment had been entered against them, that they 
timely sought to set aside the judgment, and that they had meritorious defenses to the 
action. (Appellees' Br. 13-14). While Smith Springs recites the excusable neglect 
standard for setting aside default judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), this is the wrong 
rule.1 The Fullingims did not seek to set aside the default judgment entered against them 
under Rule 60(b)(1) excusable neglect. Rather, the Fullingims sought (and still seek) to 
set aside the default judgment entered against them in favor of Smith Springs under Rule 
60(b)(4) because the default judgment is void. (R. 100.) Motions brought pursuant to 
Rule 60(b)(4) have entirely different standards and do not require a showing of timeliness 
or meritorious defenses. Smith Springs' continued citation to Rule 60(b)(1) rather than 
60(b)(4) is a rather transparent effort to obtain a less strict standard of review by this 
Court and argue irrelevant facts, which it believes are pejorative to the Fullingims. 
Smith Springs' Table of Authorities reveals nine citations to Rule 60(b)(1) and 
none to Rule 60(b)(4). 
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I. The District Court Failed To Use The Proper Standard When Considering 
The Fullingims' Motion for Relief From Judgment 
A. The District Court's Determination On the Question of Jurisdiction is 
Afforded No Deference 
The Fullingims sought (and still seek) to set aside the default judgment entered 
against them in this case under Rule 60(b)(4) because the judgment was void for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment under rule 60(b) is ordinarily 
reversed only for an abuse of discretion. However, when a motion to 
vacate a judgment is based on a claim of lack of jurisdiction [i.e. void under 
Rule 60(b)(4) for lack of jurisdiction], the district court has no discretion: 
if jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due 
process to the one against whom it runs. Therefore, the propriety of the 
jurisdictional determination, and hence the decision not to vacate, because a 
question of law upon which we do not defer to the trial court. 
Jackson Constr. Co. v. Marrs, 2004 UT 89, ^ 8, 100 P.3d 1211 (emphasis added) 
(quoting State v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1129 (Utah 1989)) (further citations omitted). In 
the present dispute, the district court's June 1, 2005, Order Denying [the Fullingims'] 
Motion for Relief from Judgment is, in fact, void as a result of Smith Springs' failure to 
effect proper service of process as required by URCP Rule 4. 
In their Motion for Relief from Judgment, the Fullingims specified that the default 
judgment entered against them was void because they were never properly served with 
summons. (R. 99.) "Whether service of process was proper is a jurisdictional issue" 
reviewed under a "correction-of-error" standard." Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 
P.2d 768, 771 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). "The determination of whether the constitutional 
requirement has been met by the type of process . . . is a question of law" and appellate 
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courts afford "no deference to the trial court's determination as to that question." Id. at 
772. The Fullingims only had the burden before the district court to prove that 
jurisdiction was absent in this case, see Jackson Constr., 2004 UT 89 at ]f 9, and the 
District Court incorrectly determined that this burden had not been met. Thus, reversal is 
mandated. 
B. The District Court Failed to Properly Apply the Due Diligence Standard 
to The Fullingims' Motion for Relief from Judgment 
The district court clearly used the wrong standard for evaluating the Fullingims' 
Motion for Relief from Judgment. In its Memorandum Decision, the district court denied 
the Fullingims' motion because "Defendants failed to meet the three requirements 
necessary to set aside the default judgment." (R. 187.) As the standard for reviewing a 
void judgment does not have these three requirements, the district court's statement 
exposes its application of the entirely wrong standard.3 On appeal, this Court should 
apply the appropriate standard and overturn the district court's incorrect denial of the 
Fullingims' motion. 
2
 To be relieved from default judgment under Rule 60(b)(1), a defendant "must not 
only show that the judgment was entered against him through excusable neglect (or any 
other reason specified in Rule 60(b) but he must also show that his motion to set aside the 
judgment was timely, and that he has a meritorious defense to the action." State v. 
Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055-56 (Utah 1983). This standard does not apply to 
motions made pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) for lack of service of process as discussed 
below. 
3
 Curiously, the district court blurred the distinction between Rule 60(b)(1) and 
60(b)(4) by also stating that it found that Smith Springs "complied with the provisions to 
URCP 4 and exercised reasonable diligence and good faith in attempts to serve 
defendants," thereby justifying a determination that the default judgment was "not void 
for lack of jurisdiction." (R. 187.) However, it is clear that the court relied on the "three 
requirements" of Rule 60(b)(1). (Id.) 
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1. Smith Springs failed to comply with the due diligence 
requirement by not contacting Fullingims Utah counsel 
The question of whether Smith Springs exercised reasonable diligence and good 
faith in their attempts to serve the Fullingims only arises because Smith Springs sought 
alternative means to serve the Fullingims pursuant to Rule 4(d)(4)(A) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Rule 4(d)(4)(A) provide as follows: 
[w]here the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served are unknown 
and cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence, where service upon 
all of the individual parties is impracticable under the circumstances, or 
where there exists good cause to believe that the person to be served is 
avoiding service of process, the party seeking service of process may file a 
motion supported by affidavit requesting an order allowing service by 
publication or by some other means. The supporting affidavit shall set forth 
the efforts made to identify, locate or serve the party to be served. 
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 4(d)(4)(A). As Utah courts have noted, this rule 
requires that a plaintiff demonstrate by affidavit two things before 
alternative service will be granted when a person's identity or address is 
unknown: (1) the identity or location of the person to be served is unknown, 
and (2) the identity or location cannot be ascertained through reasonable 
diligence. It is not enough for the affidavit to aver generally these two 
facts, but it must also state the specific efforts made to identify, locate, or 
serve the party. 
Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768, 773 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). The affidavit 
must demonstrate that the plaintiff has met the "diligence requirement'' to locate and 
serve the defendant. Id. "Because the Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution requires that ca plaintiff must act diligently and take such steps in attempting 
to give the defendant actual notice of the proceeding as are reasonably practicable,' this 
diligence requirement is ;one [Utah courts] imply to avoid constitutional infirmities.'" 
Id. (quoting Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269, 1275, 1277 (Utah 1987)). Thus, the rule in 
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Utah is "if a plaintiff falsely avers or intentionally misleads a court to believe that he or 
she has exercised such diligence when he or she has not done so, the court although at the 
time appearing to have jurisdiction, never had jurisdiction because the plaintiff never met 
the constitutional mandate." Id. This is precisely what Smith Springs did. 
Smith Springs' "evidence" in support of its diligence requirement was insufficient, 
incomplete, and misleading, and the district court erred in allowing alternative service 
based on this "evidence." For example, Smith Springs failed to inform the district court 
that Smith Springs knew that the Fullingims had retained and were represented by Utah 
counsel, Steven E. Clyde, Esq., and it had made no attempt to inform Utah Counsel of 
this lawsuit or contact Utah counsel about accepting service of the complaint for the 
Fullingims. 
The standard for meeting the due diligence requirement has been defined by Utah 
courts: "Due diligence must be tailored to fit the circumstances of each case. It is that 
diligence which is appropriate to accomplish the end sought and which is reasonably 
calculated to do so." Weber v. Snyderville West, 800 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(citations omitted). Further, the courts have clearly explained that: 
The diligence to be pursued and shown by the affidavit is that which is 
reasonable under the circumstances and not all possible diligence which 
may be conceived. Nor is it that diligence which stops just short of the 
place where if it were continued might reasonably be expected to uncover 
an address or the fact of death of the person on whom service is sought. 
There have been cases where the plaintiff in an action to quiet title or in a 
divorce action was not untruthful in setting down details in the affidavit to 
show diligence; yet like a person who bustles with activity but 
accomplishes little, makes an imposing recital of nonproductive diligence. 
Such type of'diligence' when probed may reveal a design to draw attention 
away from the fact that a further pursuit might result in an unwelcome 
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disclosure of the action address of the defendant. 
Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768, 775 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Parker v. 
Ross, 117 Utah 417, 427-28, 217 P.2d 373, 379 (1950) (Wolfe, J., concurring specially) 
(further citations omitted)). Smith Springs' incomplete statements were not untruthful 
about the attempts it caused to be made to effect service on the Fullingims. However, 
Smith Springs did not fulfill its due diligence requirement because it failed to disclose the 
whole truth to the district court. 
"Due diligence is not 'diligence which stops just short of the place where if it were 
continued might reasonably be expected to uncover an address . . . of the person on 
whom service is sought.'" Bonneville Billing, 949 P.2d at 775 (citation omitted). "To 
meet the reasonable diligence requirement, a plaintiff must take advantage of readily 
available sources of relevant information. A plaintiff who focuses on only one or two 
sources, while turning a blind eye to the existence of other available sources, falls short 
of this standard." Jackson Constr. Co. v. Marrs, 2004 UT 89, Tf 20, 100 P.3d 1211. 
Smith Springs knew that the Fullingims had retained and were represented by a Utah 
attorney in this dispute with Smith Springs; however, it made no attempt to contact the 
Fullingims' Utah counsel to see if he would accept service of summons on their behalf or 
could direct them on how the Fullingims could be served. Further, Smith Springs failed 
to inform Fullingims' Utah counsel that it was seeking and would ultimately obtain 
permission by the district court to serve his clients by publication virtually assuring a 
default would be taken. If Smith Springs had picked up the telephone and so informed 
Mr. Clyde, certainly steps would have been taken to appear and defend on the 
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Fullingims' behalf. 
Only six months before the complaint was filed, Smith Springs' counsel had been 
in direct contact with Steve Clyde, the Fullingims' counsel. Smith Springs tries to justify 
its actions by relying heavily on the Affidavit of David L. Knowles, asserting that the 
Fullingims had had a series of attorneys and that Steven Clyde, the Fullingims' attorney, 
"sounded frustrated" with the Fullingims the last time during their last communication. 
(R. 138-139.) Smith Springs asserts without any factual basis whatsoever that contacting 
Steven Clyde would have been "fruitless." Indeed, Smith Springs speculates that because 
Steven Clyde would not have accepted service, but rather "would have sought the 
Fullingims permission to accept service of process on their behalf," (R. 113), their failure 
to contact him was appropriate. 
However, the reality is that at the time the Complaint was filed, Smith Springs 
knew that its last contact with the Fullingims before filing the complaint had been 
through their Utah attorney, Steven Clyde. (Affidavit of David Knowles f^ 10, R. 139.) 
Therefore, Smith Springs first action after filing the Complaint, before initiating service 
on the Fullingims, should have been to call Steven Clyde to (1) inform him that a 
Complaint had been filed and (2) determine if he would accept service on behalf of the 
Fullingims. Steven Clyde expressly stated in this affidavit that "If I had been contacted 
by Plaintiffs counsel, I would have sought my clients' permission to accept service of 
process on their behalf." (Affidavit of Steven E. Clyde ^ 7, R. 113, attached in the 
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Addendum as Tab A.)4 One simple telephone call would have saved Smith Springs from 
making unnecessary, and ultimately unsuccessful attempts at service the Fullingims and 
could have avoided the significant delay that finally resulted in an Order of Dismissal by 
the district court on February 12, 2003. (R. 9.) 
In Weber v. Snyderville West, 800 P.2d 316 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), plaintiffs 
counsel had a business address for the defendant, Snyderville West, a Utah general 
partnership, but not the name of an individual at the business address to ser/e. Plaintiff 
made several efforts to determine the proper person and place to serve summons by 
searching "telephone directories, motor vehicle files, corporate filings in Utah and 
California, the County Recorder's files in Summit and Salt Lake Counties, and in postal 
records." Id. at 319. Without discovering an individual to serve, the plaintiff sought 
permission to serve the defendant Snyderville West and others by publication, which was 
granted. See id. at 317. After publication of summons and the failure of Snyderville 
West to appear, default judgment was entered against Snyderville West. See id. 
Snyderville West successfully sought to have the default judgment set aside. On appeal, 
this Court noted that the plaintiff made no inquiry at the known address to determine 
whether an individual was there upon whom service could be made. It noted that if 
inquiry had been directed to the address, "one of two things would have happened, either 
of which would have served counsel's purpose." Id. at 319 n.6. The Plaintiff would have 
4
 Indeed, if Smith Springs failure to contact known Utah counsel, which is at the 
very least unprofessional, discourteous, and uncivil, is allowed, condoned, and rewarded 
by this Court, the tremendous efforts by Utah's Courts, both trial and appellate, to 
promote professionalism, civility, and courtesy, will be undermined. Such behavior 
should not be rewarded. 
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learned that some one was there upon whom service could have been perfected, or that 
service could not be perfected at that address. Id. One single telephone call to Steven 
Clyde, in the present case, would have provided Smith Springs with that same 
information. However, no effort was made to call Steven Clyde, and the district court 
was not informed of Mr. Clyde's involvement or that contacting him was even an option 
when Smith Springs sought permission for service by publication. 
Smith Springs self-servingly speculated before the district court that "[i]n good 
faith, [Smith Springs] had no reason to believe that service on the attorney would have 
been successful." (R. 129.) Experience and common practice in Utah states otherwise. 
Service is regularly accepted by counsel on behalf of clients. This is a preferable practice 
for many reasons, not the least of which is to prevent situations such as this. Also, to the 
contrary, however, Smith Springs' attorney had already contacted Mr. Clyde (the 
Fullingims' counsel at the time) about this dispute prior to commencing litigation. And 
Mr. Clyde had immediately responded and left a message with Smith Springs' counsel 
the very next day (R. 139). There is no indication that further contact with Mr. Clyde 
would have resulted in any less prompt response from Mr. Clyde. At the very least, 
contacting Mr. Clyde would have given Smith Springs actual knowledge of the status of 
Mr. Clyde's relationship with the Fullingims. Certainly, "ordinary prudence" should have 
prompted Smith Springs to contact Mr. Clyde in an effort to serve the Fullingims. By 
failing to attempt service through the Fullingims' legal counsel, Smith Springs failed to 
exercise reasonable diligence. 
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2. The information Smith Springs provided was insufficient to 
justify alternative service 
Smith Springs seeks to explain several attempts to serve the Fullingims prior to 
seeking permission for alternative service. (Appellees' Br. 16-18). The fact is that Smith 
Springs filed its complaint on September 13, 2002. (R. 1.) On February 12, 2003, the 
trial court entered an Order of Dismissal because Smith Springs had not served the 
Fullingims within 120 days of filing its complaint.5 (R. 9.) After the Order of Dismissal 
was filed, Smith Springs filed an Amended Complaint, (R. 11-18), and a Motion for 
Service by Publication and/or by Mail. (R. 19-20.) The motion's only reference to 
attempts to serve the Fullingims is as follows: "Attempts to locate Defendants JOHN P. 
FULLINGIM AND KRISTIN E. FULLINGIM have been unsuccessful in that it is 
believed Mr. and Mrs. Fullingim are avoiding service as evidenced by the attached 
affidavits." (R. 20.) The only affidavit submitted with the motion was an affidavit of an 
employee of Smith Knowles & Hamilton, Andrea Dover. (R. 21-26.) Andrea Dover's 
affidavit states in full as follows: 
1. Affiant is the employee of Smith, Knowles & Hamilton, counsel of 
record for Smith Springs, LLC, in the above-referenced matter, and the 
information contained in this affidavit is based upon my personal 
knowledge. 
2. Attached is a true and correct copy of the envelope that the Summons 
and Complaint were sent in and the Certified Mail Restricted Delivery 
5
 Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that if summons is not 
served within 120 days from the date the action is commenced, the action shall be 
dismissed without prejudice "on application of any party or upon the court's own 
initiative." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 4(b). 
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Receipt showing that the Summons and Complaint were unclaimed.6 
3. Also attached is a true and correct copy of an affidavit of the Sheriff 
Department in Dallas County Texas, hired by Smith, Knowles and 
Hamilton to serve Mr. and Mrs. Fullingim showing that they tried eight 
different times, but could not serve the Summons and Complaint.7 
(R. 21-22.) This is the only "evidence" provided by Smith Springs to support a claim of 
due diligence necessary to obtain court approval of an alternative means of service. This 
"evidence" does not meet the due diligence standard. 
In order to properly obtain the court's permission for alternative service, a plaintiff 
has a duty to provide an accurate affidavit showing reasonable diligence. A plaintiffs 
affidavit is insufficient "if it states mere conclusions as to diligent search and inquiry. It 
must set forth facts upon which the court can base a judgment as to whether such 
diligence has been exercised to meet that requirement. Downey State Bank v. Major-
Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507, 509 (Utah 1976). Indeed, Utah courts have long held that 
"a plaintiff who seeks to avail himself of the statutory mode for a constructive service of 
summons must exercise good faith in his representations to the court or judge." 
Liebhardt v. Lawrence, 40 Utah 243, 120 P. 215, 219 (1911). 
6
 In its brief, Smith Springs asserts that it sent the Summons and Complaint to the 
Fullingims' Texas address by certified mail, restricted delivery, in September as well as 
in October. (Appellees' Br.. 9-10, 16). However, information concerning the attempt in 
September was not included in the Affidavit of Andrea Dover in support of the Motion 
for Service by Publication and/or by Mail. As this assertion was not before the district 
court as part of Smith Springs' Motion for Service by Publication and/or by Mail, it 
cannot be considered by this Court. 
The document is titled "Writ of Enforcement Return" and is apparently signed by 
the Deputy Sheriff, but the signature is not notarized and is not otherwise in the form of 
an affidavit. (R. 23.) 
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It is true that a Motion to Reinstate Plaintiffs Complaint was filed on March 21, 
2003, by Smith Springs, (R. 44-45), but it is not true, as stated in the Appellee's Brief that 
the Motion for Service by Publication and/or by Mail was filed on March 21, 2003. 
{Compare Appellees' Br. 7 to id. at 10.) Instead, Smith Springs attached to the 
memorandum in support of its Motion to Reinstate Plaintiffs Complaint its previously 
filed motion for alternative service and Affidavit of Andrea Dover as exhibits. (R. 35-
42.) Then, Smith Springs also, for the first time, indicated to the court that it had 
attempted to serve the Fullingims at their Utah vacation residence. (R. 43.) This 
information was not available to the district court through its motion for alternative 
service though, and in any event the service attempted on the Fullingims' Utah vacation 
residence did not occur until March 14, 2003, over a month after the district court had 
entered the Order of Dismissal. (Id.) However, Smith Springs relies heavily on this 
attempted service in Utah to support its claim that the due diligence requirement was met. 
(Appellees'Br, 17-18.) 
3. Smith Springs failed to timely attempt service on the 
Fullingims in Utah 
In addition, Smith Springs asserts that it made an attempt to serve the Fullingims 
8
 Smith Springs asserts that the Motion for Service by Publication and/or by Mail 
was filed on March 21, 2003. (Appellees' Br. 20.) In reality, this motion was first filed 
on March 10, 2003 (R. 19-21), four days before service in Utah was attempted on the 
Fullingims. On March 21, 2003, the Motion for Service by Publication and/or by Mail 
was attached only as Exhibit D to the Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reinstate 
Plaintiffs Complaint. Neither the Motion to for Service by Publication and/or by Mail 
nor the Affidavit of Andrea Dover in support of that motion were "updated" at that time 
to include information concerning the untimely attempt to serve the Fullingims in Utah. 
(R. 53-42.) ! 
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at their Utah address. (R. 17-18.) The Weber court chastised the plaintiff for not making 
any inquiry at the defendant's known Utah address. Weber, 800 P.2d at 319. Indeed, the 
court stated "[a] plaintiff seeking authority for service by publication on a defendant for 
whom an in-state address is known must, at a minimum, make inquiry at that address. . . . 
Service by publication is inappropriate where no personal inquiry is made at a last 
known address within the state." Id. at 319. However, Smith Springs made no attempt to 
serve the Fullingims at their Utah residence until more than 120 days after the action had 
commenced and after the Order of Dismissal had been signed. The information 
concerning this untimely attempted service was not provided to the district court as 
evidence in support of the motion for alternative service. (R. 19-26.) 
Members of Smith Springs knew where the Fullingims' Utah residence was 
located. (R. 135.) The evidence provided by Smith Springs shows that the deputy sheriff 
in Texas had been told "on 12-26-02" that the "Fullingims were in Utah and not back 
until middle of January," (R. 23), yet no attempt was made to follow up on this 
information. In its Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reinstate Plaintiffs 
Complaint, counsel for Smith Springs indicated that "[his] office contacted the Dallas 
County Sheriffs Office twice to check on service." (R. 32.) They should have been 
aware of the opportunity to serve the Fullingims while they were in Utah. However, no 
attempt was made to serve the Fullingims at their Utah address until after the case had 
been ordered dismissed. Because Smith Springs failed to follow up on information 
readily available to it and attempt to timely serve the Fullingims while in Utah, the 
district court erred in granting the motion for alternative service. 
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Smith Springs' flurry of activity in attempting to locate and serve the Fullingims 
amounted to a "bustle[ of] activity ... accomplishing] little," Bonneville Billing v. 
Whatley, 949 P.2d 768, 775 (Utah Ct. App.)? an "imposing recital of nonproductive 
diligence" when "further pursuit [would have] resulted] in ... the actual address of the 
defendants]," id. Smith Springs' several attempts did not rise to the level of "reasonable 
diligence" under Utah law because they failed to take advantage of readily available 
sources of relevant information known to Smith Springs. Jackson Constr. Co. v. Marrs, 
2004 UT 89, Tf 20, 100 P.3d 1211 (emphasis added). Therefore the district court erred in 
granting Smith Springs' request for permission to use alternative service of process on 
the Fullingims, making the default judgment void. 
C Smith Springs Cannot Avoid Its Due Diligence Responsibility By 
Asserting that the Fullingims were Avoiding Service of Process 
Smith Springs seeks to misdirect the attention of this Court when it asserts that it 
had "good cause" to believe that the Fullingims were avoiding service. Such belief is 
irrelevant and does not excuse Smith Springs' failure of due diligence by refusing to 
contact Mr. Clyde. However, arguendo, even if this argument had some relevance, Smith 
Springs cannot establish good cause. In support of this good cause belief, Smith Springs 
points to its assertion that ten attempts were made to serve the defendants at their Texas 
residence. Its support for this argument is two certified mail deliveries returned 
undelivered and the assertion by a Dallas County Deputy Sheriff that eight attempts were 
made to serve the Fullingims between December 9, 2002 and February 14, 2003. 
(Appellees' Br. 22.) However, the deputy sheriffs assertion does not indicate when the 
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eight attempts were made, but does indicate that during at least a portion of the time 
service in Texas was attempted, there was reason to believe that the Fullingims were 
actually in Utah. (R. 23.) Additionally, Smith Springs spins the attempted service on the 
Fullingims in Utah as an indication that the Fullingims were avoiding service. It asserts 
that the fact that a few days after one of its members identified the Fullingims' car in the 
driveway of its Utah Residence, the sheriff did not locate the Fullingims at that residence 
on March 14, 2003, gave Smith Springs additional "good cause" to believe the 
Fullingims were avoiding process using self-serving speculation to fill in numerous 
blanks. 
As has been mentioned earlier, however, this assertion was never even a 
consideration for the Motion for Service by Publication and/or Mail, since the motion 
was filed four days before service was even attempted on the Fullingims in Utah. In the 
present case, because Smith Springs never satisfied its duty of reasonable diligence, its 
claims of avoidance of service, which the Fullingims strenuously dispute, are irrelevant, 
pejorative, and misleading, and cannot be used to justify its failure to secure proper 
service. See, e.g., Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269, 1276 (Utah 1987) (Pointing out that a 
plaintiff cannot satisfy due process or Rule 4(d) (then Rule 4(f)) by making substitute 
service "without first having shown that diligent efforts have been made to locate the 
defendant''). Before attempting to obtain the district court's permission for alternative 
service under Rule 4(d)(4), Smith Springs had a duty to cause service to occur through 
known reasonable and practical methods of obtaining service of summons. Smith 
Springs could have established through a single telephone call to Mr. Clyde whether 
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service could be accomplished through the Fullingims' Utah counsel. It also knew or 
should have known that the Fullingims were in Utah through at least the middle of 
January and available to be served at their Utah residence. Smith Springs failed to 
exercise reasonable diligence, and alleging avoidance of service is merely an attempt to 
misdirect and distract this court from the real issue, which cannot be ignored or 
overlooked. 
D. Smith Springs Used Insufficient Alternative Service in this Case 
Smith Springs argues that this Court should determine whether the alternative 
service ordered by the district court was reasonably calculated to give the Fullingims 
sufficient notice of this action. "A fundamental requirement of due process, as mandated 
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, is that notice be given 
that 'is reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of 
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.'" 
Provo River Water Users' Assoc, v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 934 (Utah 1993) (quoting 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). While the 
Fullingims maintain their position that alternative service was improper in this matter, 
they also maintain that the alternative method of service selected by Plaintiff cannot be 
said to be "reasonably calculated . . . to apprise the interested parties of the pendency of 
the action" as required by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4(d)(4)(B). Smith Springs 
had already tried to serve the Fullingims by certified mail without success; the mail was 
returned unclaimed. (R. 26.) Allowing service by mail amounted to unlawfully waiving 
the Fullingims' Due Process rights because under the circumstances, it was already 
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known that such attempts had failed. Indeed, such service was be calculated to fail, given 
the circumstances already known in this case. Therefore, alternative service by certified 
mail was clearly not calculated to meet the constitutional standard required "to apprise 
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present 
their objections." Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (citations omitted). 
II. A Motion Pursuant To Rule 60(B)(4) For Failure Of Process Has No 
Timeliness Or Meritorious Defenses Requirements 
Smith Springs erroneously claims that the Fullingims were obligated to show that 
their motion to set aside the default judgment was timely and that they had a meritorious 
defense to Smith Springs' claims. Utah courts have clearly explained and hold that when 
a defendant seeks to set aside a void default judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) for 
failure of service of process, timeliness and meritorious defenses are not at issue and need 
not be asserted. 
Under certain circumstances, the reasonable time requirement may apply to 
challenges brought pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) "[b]ut where the judgment is void because 
of a fatally defective service of process, the time limitations of Rule 60(b) have no 
application." Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288, 290 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added). The 
Court then cited commentary to the federal rule as support for its position. 
Rule 60(b)(4) . . . authorizes relief from void judgments. Necessarily a 
motion under this part of the rule differs markedly from motions under the 
other clauses of Rule 60(b). There is no question of discretion on the part 
of the court when a motion is under Rule 60(b)(4). Nor is there any 
requirement, as there usually is when default judgments are attacked under 
Rule 60(b), that the moving party show that he has a meritorious defense. 
Either a judgment is void or it is valid. Determining which it is may well 
present a difficult question, but when that question is resolved, the court 
4838-8414-4385.FU001.001 17 
must act accordingly. 
By the same token, there is no time limit on an attack on a judgment as 
void. The one-year [three-month, in Utah] limit applicable to some Rule 
60(b) motions is expressly inapplicable, and even the requirement that the 
motion be made within a "reasonable time," which seems literally to apply 
to motions under rule 60(b)(4), cannot be enforced with regard to this class 
of motion. A void judgment cannot acquire validity because of laches on 
the part of the judgment debtor. 
Id. at 290-91 (quoting Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2862). 
See also Woody v. Rhodes, 23 Utah 2d 249, 250-51, 461 P.2d 465, 466 (1969) (holding 
that when semce of summons is fatally defective, the three-month provision of Rule 
60(b) has no application). Thus, Utah law follows the federal rule in applying Rule 
60(b)(4). 
In another attempt to avoid the merits of the Rule 60(b)(4) motion, Smith Springs 
incorrectly argues that the three month time period contained in Rule 60(b) applies to the 
Fullingims' motion. Rule 60(b) states that motions for relief from judgment "shall be 
made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1) [mistake], (2) [newly discovered 
evidence], or (3) [fraud], not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding 
was entered or taken." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 60(b). The Fullingims did not argue mistake, 
newly discovered evidence or fraud. Rather, the Fullingims brought their motion for 
relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) because the default judgment was void for 
failure of service of process. Smith Springs also attempts to distract this Court and 
disparage the Fullingims by claiming that they waited too long to file their motion 
because by December 2003, they knew that an action had been filed. (Appellees' Br. 32.) 
As has been explained, a default judgment void for failure of semce of process does not 
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have any timeliness requirement, as the district court had no jurisdiction to enter any 
judgment. Additionally, even if Smith Springs' argument had some relevance, the 
Fullingims only had some indication that an action had been filed; they did not know that 
a default judgment had been entered. The information they learned caused them to 
contact their Utah counsel, Steven Clyde, who told them that he knew nothing of a 
complaint being filed.9 (R. 99.) Understandably, no further inquiry was made by the 
Fullingims. The Fullingims did not receive actual notice of the entry of the default 
judgment until October, 2004. Shortly after receiving this notice, they filed their Motion 
for Relief from Judgment. 
Under express Utah law, a void judgment must be set aside without regard to how 
long it has been since the judgment in question was rendered or the perceived merit or 
meritlessness of the judgment in the eyes of the district court judge. Ultimately, if failure 
of proper service deprived the district court of jurisdiction to enter the default judgment, 
that judgment must now be set aside regardless of any other fact. No further inquiry is 
appropriate. Because the default judgment entered against the Fullingims is void for lack 
of effective service, there is neither a time limit nor a meritorious defense requirement to 
set aside a void judgment. As the district court clearly erred by denying the Fullingims' 
Motion for Relief from Judgment based on its erroneous determination that the 
Fullingims had failed to timely file their motion and present a meritorious defence, this 
Court should set aside the default judgment entered against the Fullingims. 
This information was not included in any affidavits, but was placed in the 
Fullingims' Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Relief from Judgment. (See R. 
99.) 
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III. The Default Judgment Should Be Set Aside Because It Was Not Signed by 
Judge As Required by Rule 55(b)(2) 
Smith Springs asserts the signing of the default judgment by the clerk was 
harmless error because Judge Baldwin reviewed the entry of default judgment by the 
clerk when he entered the Order on November 20, 2003, when he stated that Smith 
Springs may "require a reconnection fee, if and when the Defendants bring their 
delinquency current." (Appellees' Br. 35; R. 91.) In addition, Smith Springs claims that 
the remedy is simply to remand the contractual damage issue to the district court for a 
hearing. (Appellees' Br. 36.) The entry of default judgment by the clerk was not 
harmless error, and the default judgment should therefore be set aside. 
An error is not harmless if refusal to set aside the error "appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 61. In addition to its other fatal 
flaws—and sufficient in itself to invalidate it—the October 2003 Default Judgment was 
entered, not by the district court, as prescribed by Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, but by a deputy court clerk. Rule 55 specifies that 
Judgment by default may be entered as follows: ... Upon request of the 
plaintiff the clerk shall enter [default] judgment for the amount claimed and 
costs against the defendant if: 
(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear; 
(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person; 
(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1); and 
(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that 
can be made certain by computation. 
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 55(b)(1) (emphasis added). uIn all other cases,"* the rule requires "the 
party entitled to a judgment by default [to] apply to the court therefor." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 
55(b)(2) (emphasis added). The purpose of requiring the court to enter default judgment 
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apparently is to allow the court "to make an investigation of any other matter" and to 
allow the court to "conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary 
and proper." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 55(b)(2). This simply did not occur. 
In this case, the Fullingims were not "personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1)," 
as required by rule 55(b)(1)(C). Under Utah law, the district court clerk is empowered to 
enter default judgment only if "the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 
4(d)(1)" and the other three Rule 55 conditions are met. Utah R. Civ. Pro 55(b)(1). 
Absent the required personal service, authority for the clerk to enter default judgment did 
not exist. According to the plain language of the rule, only the district court itself could 
have entered default judgment. Under such circumstances as appear in this case, the 
drafters of Rule 55(b)(2) determined that a district court should directly review a motion 
for entry of default judgment. See Utah R. Civ. Pro. 55(b)(2). Given the opportunity to 
undertake such a review, the district court might have, through further investigation, 
realized, and ruled, that service by mail was not "reasonably calculated . . . to apprise the 
[Fullingims] of the pendency of the action." See Utah R. Civ. Pro. 4(d)(4)(B). 
Regardless, the rule prohibited the clerk from signing the default judgment because the 
Fullingims had not been personally served, and required that the default judgment be 
entered by the district court. Failure to follow the rule was inconsistent with substantial 
justice; therefore, this court must grant the Fullingims relief from void default judgment 
ofOctober3,2003. 
CONCLUSION 
Smith Springs failed to fulfill the reasonable diligence requirement and should not 
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have been granted leave to use alternative service. Despite this failure, the district court 
allowed Smith Springs to attempt service by alternative means that were not, under the 
circumstances, calculated to give the Fullingims actual notice of Smith Springs' 
complaint. As the district court's jurisdiction was improperly invoked, the Default 
Judgment should be set aside as void. For all of the reasons explained in their briefs, the 
Fullingims respectfully request this Court to overturn the district court's denial of their 
Motion for Relief from Judgment and direct the district court to enter an order setting 
aside the Default Judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this J ^ d a y of August, 2006. 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
72, 6 / ^ j f c ^ 
J. Craig Smith 
Scott M. Ellsworth 
R. Christopher Preston 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this )tf* day of August, 2006, I caused to be mailed via 
first-class, U.S. mail, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the APPELLANTS' 
REPLY BRIEF addressed as follows: 
J. Steven Newton 
Bilinda K. Townsend 
Business Law Associates, L.C. 
8170 South Highland Drive, E-5 
Sandy, Utah 84093 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
-Z.CPJ.-J*, c V.. 'A*Jf?-^> 
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ADDENDUM 
TAB A - Affidavit of Steven E. Clyde, dated January 4, 2005 
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Tab A 
J. Craig Smith, (#4143) 
R. Christopher Preston (#9195) 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
215 South State Street, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 413-1600 
Facsimile: (801) 413-1620 
Attorneys jor Defendants John P. Fullingim and 
Kristin K. Fullingim 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
SMITH SPRINGS LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN P. FULLINGIM and 
KRISTIN K. FULLINGIM, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN E. CLYDE 
Civil No. 020906507 
Judge Parley R. Baldwin 
Affidavit ot Steven E Clyde 
S T A T E O F U T A H ) 11|| | | IIIj II III | | | | | jllll II i l l 11111 lljl! IIIII | | | | | iin ill } s s IIIII I I I Jill 1111 IIIII IIIII IIIII IIIII IIIII 1111 HI HI 
C O U N T Y O F S A L T L A K E ) ''"" •»•»• I" 1 "M III™ "••IMil UM IIIII IIIII llll III 
VD18258865 
020906507 FULLINGIM.JOHN P 
Steven E. Clyde deposes and states: 
1. I am over the age of twenty-one, have personal knowledge of the facts in this 
affidavit, and am competent to testify. 
2. I was retained by John and Kristin Fullingim on or about March 18, 2002, to 
represent them in their dispute with Smith Springs LLC. 
3. On March 18, 2002, 1 sent a letter to David L. Knowles, who represented Smith 
Springs LLC, informing him that 1 had been retained by the Fullingims. (A true and 
correct copy of this letter is attached hereto as Exhibit A.) 
4. At no time did I receive any indication that a lawsuit had been filed. 
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I received no notice from Mr. Knowles, the Smiths' attorney, that he had filed or was 
going to file a complaint in this matter. 
It is my habitual practice to accept service of process from opposing counsel on 
behalf of my clients to avoid the necessity of service of process, so long as my clients 
do not object. 
If I had been contacted by Plaintiffs counsel, I would have sought my clients' 
permission to accept service of process on their behalf. 
I have had no contact from the Smiths' attorney since about April 3, 2002. 
I ended my representation of John and Kristin shortly afterwards. 
DATED this ^ 4 day of January, 2005. 
Steven E. Clyde 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN this *P day of January, 2005. 




201 So Main St., St«. 1300 
Salt U N CHy, UT 84111-2216 
My CommtMJof) Expires 
September 27, 2008 
STATE OF UTAH 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Steven E. Clyde was 
mailed by United States Is' class mail, postage prepaid, on this _\(f_ day of January, 2005 to the 
following: 
L. Deane Smith, Jr. 
Smith Springs, LLC 
10 W FIRST S #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
^(lUpl'VxJ^ 
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Exhibit A 
C E ONOW S E S S I O N S & w ^SON 
CLARK W. SESSIONS 
RODNEY G. SNOW 
STEVEN E. CLYDE 
HAL N. SWENSON 
WILLIAM VOGEL 
E. BARNEY GESAS 
EDWIN C. BARNES 
GARY L. PAXTON 
NEIL A. KAPLAN* 
D. BRENT ROSE 
CHARLES R. BROWN 
J . SCOTT HUNTER 
PERRIN R. LOVE* 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN 
ANNELI R. SMITH 
GAINER M. WALDBILLIG 
WALTER A. ROMNEY, JR. 
MATTHEW A. STEWARD 
T. MICKELL JIMENEZ ROWE 
WENDY B. CROWTHER 
JAMES P. ALDER 
*ALSO ADMITTED IN WASHINGTON. D.C. 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
ONE UTAH CENTER 
THIRTEENTH FLOOR 
2 0 I SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111-2216 




FAX (801) 521-6280 
css@clydesnow.com 
March 18, 2002 
Mr. David L. Knowles, Esq. 
Smith, Knowles & Hamilton 
4723 Harrison Boulevard, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Re: John and Kristin Fullingim / Smith Springs LLC 
Dear Mr. Knowles: 
I have just been retained by the Fullingims to represent them in this matter. I need a little 
time to get familiar with the situation, but will be in touch with you as soon as reasonably possible. 
Since your client's rights are anything but clear at this point in time, I would encourage you to ask 
your client to refrain from taking any unilateral action regarding the Fullingims5 connection to this 
well. Any such action will only precipitate litigation. 
Very truly yours, 
b w SESSIONS & SWENSON, P.C. 
CC: John and Kristin Fullingim 
J 6 
